We study the e¤ects of Central Bank transparency on in ‡ation and the output gap. We thus …rst identify a small analytical model which concludes that transparency a¤ects the variability of in ‡ation and output and not their average levels. Then we examine whether this conjecture holds empirically, employing the recently derived index of transparency by Eij¢nger and Geraats. The empirical …ndings con…rm that the averages are not a¤ected by transparency. It does seem to explain however, about 50% of the variability in in ‡ation. The relation between transparency and output volatility is less clear but appears to be positive rather than negative.
Introduction
Most economists agree that greater transparency in monetary policy is desirable because it allows the private sector to make better -that is, welfare improving -decisions, as well as better informed decisions (Blinder, 1998) . But not all agree. Some argue that incomplete transparency is optimal, as the e¤ect on the Central Bank's reputation and its consequent ability to control in ‡ation has to be balanced against the private sector's wish to see output, employment and prices stabilised (see for example Faust and Svensson, 2001 or Jensen, 2000) . Others argue that certain restrictions on transparency are important for operational reasons. Once again the idea is to reinforce the Bank's credibility (see Eij¢nger and Hoeberichts, 2002) and to separate 'the need to know' from 'the need to understand' (Issing, 1999) . In practice, many Central Banks have actually increased their transparency in recent years -using in ‡ation forecasts, extensive explanations of the reasoning behind their decisions, and sometimes voting records on policy decisions or a discussion of the 'bias' in those decisions, to do so. Prominent examples are found in the Federal Reserve System in the US; but also in the Bank of England and the Central Banks of Canada, New Zealand and Sweden. Yet, on the basis of casual empiricism or circumstantial evidence, one cannot tell whether greater transparency has actually made any material di¤erence to the policies chosen -or more exactly, to the impact and e¤ectiveness of those policies. Nor is it possible to determine exactly what kinds of e¤ects one should expect, in terms of average in ‡ation, output performance and the stability of these indicators. Our purpose in this paper is therefore, to determine what e¤ects a lack of Central Bank transparency should be expected to have on monetary policies and what impact that would have on the economy. The main problem is that transparency has many di¤erent dimensions, and may mean di¤erent things to di¤erent people (Eij¢nger and Geraats, 2002 ). Kuttner and Posen(2000) list a number of characteristics thought necessary for institutional transparency:
² a numerical goal for monetary policy, ² an in ‡ation report, explaining the expected e¤ects of changes in monetary policy ² an in ‡ation forecast (plus assumptions) explaining why those changes were necessary and, ² a post-mortem evaluation of past policies and their achievements.
These attributes cover both the information content as well as the way in which that information has been used. That distinction is important, but is seldom made 1 . This distinction itself relates directly to the potential for con ‡ict between the ability to control and the need for transparency. As a result, many commentators reach opposite conclusions about the need for transparency. Kuttner and Posen (1999) argue that it enhances the Central Bank's ability to use discretionary policies, while Faust and Svensson (2002) argue the opposite (although for particular circumstances). In fact, both sets of authors agree that transparency will reduce the noise and the imprecision in the private sector's decision making. They only di¤er as to whether greater transparency would increase the ability of the Central Bank and private sector to make consistent decisions, or whether it would reduce the Central Bank's ability to control the private sector's natural tendency to avoid monetary discipline. Since our purpose is to show what e¤ects a lack of transparency may have on the economy, we have to allow for di¤erent degrees and di¤erent forms of imperfect transparency. A lack of transparency could be said to arise when the Central Bank has private information about the nature of shocks and the way in which policy a¤ects the economy (Cukierman, 1992 (Cukierman, , 2000 ; or when the Central Bank has not stated its objectives clearly (Cukierman and Meltzer 1986) ; or when the public is uncertain about the preferences of the Central Bank (Nolan and Schaling, 1998, Muscatelli, 1998) . To allow for each of these possibilities, we present imperfect transparency in two forms: imperfect political transparency about priorities and objectives, and imperfect economic transparency about the conditioning information, shocks, target values, etc. In either case, a lack of transparency introduces a disturbance which distorts the private sector' expectations for in ‡ation. That provides an automatic link both to the incentive for the Central Bank to use its private information strategically, and to the private sector's desire to ensure accountability. In this paper we examine these e¤ects using a theoretical model of monetary policy, stripped down to its key components, and …nd that a lack of transparency does not alter the average in ‡ation or output performance of an economy. But it does a¤ect the stability of the economy, increasing both in ‡ation variability and output volatility. Interestingly, both a lack of political transparency and a lack of economic stability a¤ect the economy in the same way, so there is no possibility of distinguishing between them by their impact. Then, using a recently constructed index of Central Bank transparency due to Eij¢nger and Geraats (2002) , we test whether imperfect transparency has had the predicted e¤ects in the main OECD countries. All our theoretical predictions are upheld, but that for output stability which appears to decrease with transparency instead of increase 2 .
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 de…nes political and economic transparency and identi…es the way they a¤ect the moments of in ‡ation and the output gap. Section 3 then employs the index of transparency by Eij¢nger and Geraats (2002) to examine its empirical relevance. We look at two alternative groupings of this index and discuss the sensitivity of our results. Section 4 concludes.
The e¤ects of Greater Transparency
We adopt a Rogo¤ (1985) type model of a conservative central banker in which the Central Bank (CB) has the following objective function:
constrained by a simple Lucas supply function:
where y and ¼ are measured as deviations from their steady state paths. The model produces the following solutions for the policy variables in question:
We assume that there is only one player in the game (i.e. a single monetary authority and no …scal policy 3 ) and that there is no uncertainty in the transmission of policy e¤ects. The way k is de…ned in the literature is to note that some factors in the economy such as income taxation or unemployment insurance distort the labour-leisure decision and cause the market-determined level of employment (and output) to lie below their social optimum (Rogo¤ 1985) . A parameter k > 0 re ‡ects the policy maker's desire to correct this distortion. There have however, been many objections as to whether having a central bank that sets out to impose an in ‡ationary bias (i.e. k 6 = 0) is a sensible speci…cation to start with (Blinder 1997 ). We do not attempt to resolve that dispute here. Instead we simply note that k may be positive or zero. That is to say, we include k here because doubts about its exact value may constitute one important source of transparency problems in monetary policy.
In this paper we consider transparency problems which arise from two possible sources:
² misunderstandings about the true value of the preference parameters b, or ² misperceptions about the value of k that the Central Bank can be expected to implement 4 .
We will identify the former with political transparency and the latter with an economic form of transparency, in line with Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2001) 5 . We then examine how varying the degree of transparency, in either form, a¤ects the ability to achieve lower in ‡ation and more stable output.
2.1 Imperfect Political Transparency: the public is uncertain about the true value of b
To de…ne full transparency, we start from a general speci…cation in which the Central Bank attaches explicit weights to both its objectives. It is important to de…ne transparency in its most general form and only then impose normalisation restrictions, in order to account for all relevant information. We therefore consider a Central Bank which assigns positive numbers, a and b, as weights or priorities to the targets in its objective function:
But in identifying a loss function what we are actually interested in is not the value of each of the parameters a and b per se, but the relative weight attached to the two objectives b a ¢¼ ¢y . The issue of transparency arises when the public's perception about the bank's preferences, for example on output (¯), di¤ers from the values that the bank itself actually considers (b). We de…ne this discrepancy as¯= b +´wheré is a random error with E(´) = 0 and V (´) = ¾ 2 . This implies that the public is correct on average, but may be mistaken when making guesses about the central bank preferences in individual cases or at certain points in time. But uncertainty about b implies that the relative importance that the Central Bank attaches to controlling in ‡ation is also uncertain in the public's perception. To show this, we rescale the sum of two parameters to equal a constant, say a + b = 1. This is a simplifying assumption (see Geraats 2002 ) which helps de…ne uncertainty in a in terms of´as well, i.e. ® = a ¡´. Similarly to above, E(®) = a. However, this is not su¢cient in itself to de…ne transparency. Full transparency would also require the ratio of the two parameters as perceived by the public, to equal the ratio of the true values, on average. This is not automatically implied by the assumptions made so far, since the expectation of a ratio is not the ratio of the expectations. In fact, the perceived relative weights are :
and the possibility of full transparency requires that E ³®´= b a . We can rewrite (3) as:
where » = (a+b)á (a¡´) , and hence
We can now see that the assumption E(´) = 0 is not su¢cient for full transparency. For the Central Bank to be capable of delivering full transparency, at least potentially, E(») = 0 is also required. Imposing E(´) = 0 alone, implies that
and hence that E(¯=®) 6 = b=a. The Central Bank cannot therefore, deliver full transparency unless it provides the private sector with full information (i.e. ¾ 2 = 0) at the same time. Consequently, we de…ne full political transparency as follows:
De…nition 1: Full political transparency occurs if conditions E(´) = 0 and ¾ 2 = 0, both hold.
Note that the objective function we will be using assumes a = 1 6 . This is a convenient simpli…cation and does not change any of the qualitative results we present since the conditions for transparency remain the same. Following this de…nition, public perceptions and Central Bank preferences are related through = b +´where´has the properties de…ned above. This implies that the public will on average anticipate the correct preference parameter, i.e. E(¯) = b. But for full transparency to hold, we need ¾ 2 = 0 as well. The private sector therefore, expects the CB to implement:
with
Given this de…nition and the public's perception, we now have:
Proposition 1 If the CB can correctly anticipate what the public thinks, then an increase in political transparency reduces the variability of in ‡ation and output but it does not a¤ect their average levels.
Proof: The CB optimises the following:
leading to the following equilibrium in ‡ation path:
Note that E(¼ ¤ ) = bk = E(¼ e ) because E(¯) = b, so that the public's expectations are right on average. In that sense, this is still a rational expectations (RE) solution. Moreover, the variance of in ‡ation is:
assuming that E(´; ") = 0. The variance of in ‡ation is therefore, a function of the lack of transparency perceived by the public. Indeed as ¾ 2 increases (and transparency falls), then the variance of in ‡ation increases as well:
But the average level of in ‡ation is not a function of the variance of´and therefore remains una¤ected:
even if b 6 = 0 or k 6 = 0. We can likewise examine what happens to output. In equilibrium, output is equal to:
But this implies that E(y ¤ ) = 0 and that
if E(´; ") = 0. Again this implies that the average level of equilibrium output remains una¤ected by changes in the degree of transparency but the variance of output is reduced as political transparency increases:
Finally, comparing our results in (9) and (13) we also see that:
. Hence a lack of transparency is more damaging to output stability than it is to in ‡ation variability -and vice versa if b > 1 -the average values of both being una¤ected. We will see below that a lack of economic transparency will deliver exactly the same result, and in the same ratio.
Imperfect Economic Transparency: The Public is Uncertain about parameter k
We consider next a di¤erent form of transparency, this time relating to the public being uncertain about the value of k that the CB targets 9 The public will therefore, expect the CB to implement:
This time transparency is indexed by the variability of v and full economic transparency is identi…ed with ¾ 2 v = 0. Notice that k now contains all the conditioning information needed from outside the problem: on exogenous and random variables, on decisions made by other players and the target values imposed by the policy makers themselves.
Proposition 2
If there is uncertainty about the value of output the CB targets, then an increase in economic transparency reduces the variability of in ‡ation and output. The levels of in ‡ation and output remain, on average, una¤ected.
Proof : As the CB knows what the public's perceptions are, it will try to optimise the following loss function:
Conservative with respect to in ‡ation so that b < a = 1. 9 In this section b is known to the public without uncertainty.
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where ¼ e = bc. This results in an equilibrium level of in ‡ation of
Hence the private sector is again correct on average and the solution is a Rational Expectations equilibrium since
We can therefore write the variance of in ‡ation as:
¢ Thus the variance of in ‡ation is increasing in the variance of v, and consequently decreasing in transparency:
The results for output can be derived in a similar way. The public forms expectations for in ‡ation, ¼ e = bc. In equilibrium therefore, output is equal to:
It is easy to see that E(y ¤ ) = 0 and therefore,
In addition the variance of equilibrium output is given by:
assuming " and v to be uncorrelated. Hence the variance of output once again decreases with economic transparency.
Similarly,
if the CB is conservative (b < 1). So, just as with a lack of political transparency, a lack of economic transparency is more damaging to output stability than to in ‡ation variability in a conservative regime. At this point there is no analytic distinction between the impacts of the two di¤erent types of incomplete transparency.
Summary
² A lack of transparency, whether of the political or economic type, implies no bias in average in ‡ation or average output levels. Private sector expectations will be correct and the average in ‡ation/output outcomes will be the same as they would be under full transparency with the same parameter values. In that respect, it is not a problem that the policy makers or private sector need be concerned about.
² In the short term however, a private sector that believed the Central Bank to be more conservative than it actually is (¯< b and/or c < k), might temporarily experience lower in ‡ation and higher output than otherwise. Conversely, in ‡ation would be temporarily higher and output lower if it believed the CB to be more liberal.
² A lack of transparency does a¤ect the variability of the outcomes however. Incomplete transparency makes both in ‡ation and output more variable but it a¤ects output variability more than it does in ‡ation. Conversely, greater transparency produces more stable output and in ‡ation outcomes, but the larger gains will be in output stability. These results hold equally for both political and economic transparency under a conservative central banker (b < 1). But the greater sensitivity of output volatility would be reversed under a liberal Central Bank.
² Since the average outcomes are una¤ected, and the ratio of V (y ¤ ) to V (¼ ¤ ) is the same under a lack of political and economic transparency, there are no testable di¤erences in the outcomes from this model. That means that these two cases can only be distinguished in the data with prior information: e.g. from survey information -such as in the index we use in section 3 below -or if it is known that ¾ 2 is small relative to ¾ 2 v . But if either the zero bias or the increasing stability results in (5), (7), (8) or (9) are violated -then neither form of transparency holds and we must look for other explanations of the impact of asymmetric information on monetary policy making; and for any ine¤ectiveness in those policies which may result.
An Index of Transparency

The Index and its components
To test the signi…cance of our results in practice, we use an index of transparency recently constructed by Eij¢nger and Geraats, 2002 (henceforth E&G). The index is compiled for nine major central banks and is based on information disclosed by the banks themselves. Furthermore, it distinguishes between various aspects of transparency, based on the ways in which they a¤ect monetary policy. The E&G index is de…ned by the following components of transparency: The last column is the arithmetic sum of the individual columns and re ‡ects a measure of total transparency. Interestingly, the ordering of banks would change if one were to look at the speci…c components separately. For example, New Zealand's political, procedural and policy transparency is not matched by an equivalent degree of clarity about her actual monetary policy operations. Similarly, Australia's political transparency does not translate into an equal degree of economic and procedural transparency. At the other end of the scale, the US transparency on economic and policy matters is not matched by transparency over political priorities. Although these variations may be fairly small overall, they are bound to a¤ect the results in some way. We attempt to account for that in what follows by showing that essentially the same results hold under alternative aggregations of the transparency attributes.
Two questions however, remain. First, what is the empirical relevance of such an index, in terms of whether the degree of transparency a¤ects the main indicators of macroeconomic performance? Second, what is the relative importance of the individual components? In order to identify its empirical relevance, we regress the transparency index on, …rst, the average in ‡ation rate and its standard deviation over a speci…ed period for the countries in question; and second, on the average output deviation from trend and its standard deviation for the same sample period and same group of countries. Naturally, the choice of period considered is consistent with the institutional set-up re ‡ected in the index. Since this varies from country to county, the sample period also di¤ers for each of the nine countries. Appendix B includes a full description of the data used for each country and justi…es the choice of sample used. Figures 1-4 show the cross plots of the average and standard deviation of in ‡ation and the output gap against the index of transparency and the line of best …t given by the following model:
where i : average in ‡ation, j : indices of political, economic, SD of in ‡ation, procedural, policy, average output gap, operational and total transparency SD of output gap Parameter¸i j stands for the impact of index j on variable i. The regressions are implemented in univariate terms in order to examine the e¤ect of the index in question on the moment of a given macro variable. The …gures included report these regressions, their R 2 and the t statistic on the signi…cance of the slope parameter¸i j .
Empirical Results
² Our empirical results con…rm that there is no statistically signi…cant correlation between the index of Central Bank transparency and average in ‡ation rates, or the average output deviation from trend (and hence output growth), for our sample of nine OECD Central Banks. This con…rms the …rst of the analytical predictions derived from our theoretical model. Figures 1 and 3 show the relevant regression results, where the index of transparency is the independent variable and the t-ratio re ‡ects the signi…cance of the slope parameter (critical value: t (8);95% = 2:3).
² Looking at the components of transparency however, the picture is slightly di¤erent. We still fail to identify any signi…cant relationships between the variables and the indices. But it is interesting to see that not all components a¤ect the average level of in ‡ation and output in the same direction. Perhaps predictably, greater political, economic and policy making transparency seem to go with greater in ‡ation expectations in the markets. The same holds for output gaps but with reference to political and operational transparency only. It is worth investigating whether alternative combinations of the di¤erent aspects of transparency would produce the same results, even if the overall e¤ects appear to be less signi…cant at the aggregate level than at the component level.
² Having covered the results for average in ‡ation and output, it is the variances of in ‡ation and output that are really a¤ected by the degree of Central Bank transparency. This can be seen in …gures 2 and 4 which show how increasing transparency stabilises in ‡ation but appears to increase output variability. The former is exactly as predicted by our theoretical analysis; and this result is statistically signi…cant according to the slope coe¢cient's t-ratio (= 3:06). The latter however, is the opposite of what our theoretical analysis predicted, although it does not appear to be statistically signi…cant except in so far as operational transparency is concerned. Hence, these empirical results could be consistent with our theoretical model if the output volatility relationship is genuinely insignificant and biased to the wrong sign by small sample ‡uctuations; or if the lack of transparency refers to the degree of target conservatism k, rather than weight conservatism, b; or if the transparency index is actually picking up some other aspect of Central Bank behaviour -for example di¤ering degrees of independence or di¤ering degrees of uncertainty about how Central Banks actually formalise and pursue their own targets. Obviously, to analyse that question lies beyond the scope of this paper -if only because it may relate to a di¤erent type of transparency problem.
² One of the most interesting features of the index is that it allows us to look at the empirical relevance of each of the sub-components individually. The results attained show that it is the economic and operational components of transparency that matter the most for the variability of in ‡ation. The former refers to the transmission mechanism: the anticipated changes in the economy which are accounted for by changes in the instrument. The latter refers to the unpredictable part of the economy, not accounted for by current policy changes. Their signi…cance demonstrates that the private sector would appreciate some discussion over these two because they provide the basis for evaluating the Bank's performance. Interestingly, institutional features like independence or the existence of a quantitative target per se, summarised as the political component of transparency, appear to have a less signi…cant impact. Hence, the mere fact of granting independence, for example, is not su¢cient for transparency. What is more important is the implications of any given institutional set-up: for example how it changes the central bank's ability to evaluate their own policies or to explain their strategy or even publish forecasts. Adopting transparency may therefore be necessary. But it is the Bank's powers of communication, given that transparency, which is the su¢cient condition for helping the public understand the intentions of the monetary authorities. In as far as output variability is concerned, operational transparency is the only component that seems to have a signi…cant impact (at the 90% signi…cance level), but then in the wrong direction in that it increases the deviations from trend. The private sector therefore, seems to understand that greater clarity in the intentions of the Central Bank will entail some costs in terms of output gaps.
Alternative Weighing Schemes
In this section, we use the E&G index again but regroup its components in order to produce an index for economic and political transparency which corresponds to the theoretical model described above. We re-group the components described in Table 1 as follows: Political Transparency is now de…ned as the sum of 1a, 1c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b and 4c and Economic Transparency is now de…ned as the sum of 2a, 2b, 2c, 5a, 5b, 5c and 1b. Category 1b, which captures the existence of a quantitative target, is in our view better placed under the economic de…nition of transparency. In practice it actually makes very little di¤erence which way the scores under 1b are actually allocated. We now repeat the same regression exercise in order to establish the empirical properties of our new indices of economic and political transparency. The results can be summarised as follows (…gures 5-6):
² The average in ‡ation and in ‡ation variability results match our previous …ndings, for the new indices of political and economic transparency. The mild trends in the average in ‡ation results are clearly insigni…cant and anyway mutually o¤setting. They are likely to be the result of small sample problems therefore. But the in ‡ation stability results are signi…-cant and of the right sign in both cases. These results are exactly as our theoretical model predicts, (…gure 5).
² The average output and output stability results are again as before. There is essentially no trend in the average output results at all, as anticipated.
This result holds as before, for both types of transparency. However, the output variability results continue to show the wrong sign and more strongly now for economic transparency than for political transparency. However both relationships remain statistically insigni…cant, (…gure 6).
Sensitivity
We provide a detailed sensitivity analysis of the results derived in Appendix B and only summarise here the shortcomings of the analysis undertaken.
² Clearly, the limitations of the data cannot be emphasised often enough. The results of this exercise can therefore only be seen as correlations between variables rather than robust causal relations. There are only 9 data points which implies that the removal or addition of one observation can (and does) alter the results (See Appendix B for examples of this). We have therefore been very reluctant to remove outliers (e.g. Japan and/or Switzerland) in order to try and capture as much information as possible out of such a set. As explained in the appendix, (and shown in …gures 7 and 8) the signi…cant results attained remain robust to changes in the countries included, pointing in the direction of a substantive relationship. But elsewhere, we are not able to tell whether insigni…cant results are due to the lack of data or to a lack of correlation.
² As explained above, the mean and variance for in ‡ation and output deviations from trend are regressed against the indices of transparency. The period chosen to calculate the means and standard deviations is crucial empirically but naturally, also theoretically. It is thus important to consider the average and variance of that period which is consistent with the institutional set-up captured by the E&G index. The choice of period is based on a number of papers written by the Central Banks themselves, in which they explain their latest institutional changes and their precise timing (see Appendix B). At the same time it is important to try to keep the period as long as possible in order to include as much information in the data set as possible. We have experimented with the choice of period for the Bank of England and the ECB. The relevant timing for the UK is from the beginning of 1998 onwards. We …nd that if the moments of the UK in ‡ation and output gap series considered refer to the whole of the 1990s instead, the overall relationship between the variables and transparency weakens, (see …gure 9). In that sense, the increase in transparency at the Bank of England has clearly had desirable e¤ects. The same experiment for the Euro area does not make an appreciable di¤erence in the results and is therefore not reported.
² The results referring to deviations of output from trend, depend on the detrending method used to derive potential output. The results discussed so far rely entirely on the statistical …lters by Hodrick and Prescott, 1997 (HP). There are a number of alternative …ltering procedures however, and we experiment with the one based on the Christiano and Fitzgerald, 1999 contribution (CF). The choice of …lter does make some di¤erence -in particularly with respect to the average deviations from trend and (less so) for the variance of output. We compare …gures 3, 4 and 5, to …gures 10, 11 and 12 respectively. This comparison provides further evidence in support of our theoretical model, that transparency is related to the variance of the output gap, rather than to its average level. (see Appendix B for a detailed discussion).
Commentary and Quali…cations
Transparency and the Direction of Causality
The set-up in (16) assumes that it is transparency that a¤ects macroeconomic performance. It is oftern argued however, that low in ‡ation countries have central banks that are much keener to be transparent, while central banks that are faced with high in ‡ationary pressures are reluctant to be transparent. This in turn, implies that (16) may need to be written the opposite way, with transparency being the result of performance. The implication is that the t-statistic presented may be an unreliable measure of statistical strength. But since it is di¢cult to test for causality given the very limited number of data points, we examine the signi…cance of the correlation coe¢cients between the variables in question. This does not resolve the issue of which way the causality runs, but it does help verify the reliability of the results presented so far. We do this by applying Fisher's transformation:
This statistic is approximately normally distributed, with mean zero and standard deviation ¾ = (n ¡ 3)
, where n is the sample size, in our case 9. The hypothesis tested is H 0 : ½ = 0 against the alternative H 1 : ½ 6 = 0. A two-tail test requires j½j > 0:66 j½j > 0:584 at the 5% and 10% signi…cance levels, respectively. Since, in the univariate equation framework R 2 = ½ 2 , the transformation is equivalent to testing for R 2 > 0:44 and R 2 > 0:34, respectively. Comparing the R 2 statistic in Figures 1-12 to these two critical values, gives identical results. The strength of the relationships described above therefore, holds irrespective of the direction of causality one chooses to believe. Nevertheless, a policy maker directly interested in knowing how much transparency can a¤ect macroeconomic performance would be interested in the elasticities (and their signi…cance) implied by (16).
Transparency and Independence
The disappointing result in this analysis is that we have failed to …nd a negative relationship between the E&G index of transparency and output variability. All the other theoretical predictions have been borne out by these data on transparency. One explanation of this failure, but not the only one, is that this index of transparency con ‡ates independence with transparency in a world where one might expect independence and output volatility to be positively related. The reasons for suspecting a positive relation between transparency and independence are:
1. Political and economic independence have been recognised, over the past 15 years, as the crucial properties for good central bank performance. But as independence has increased in the OECD and European economies, so has the need for political legitimacy and public accountability led to demands for greater transparency (Blinder et al, 2001 ). These two properties therefore tend to go hand-in-hand: both transparency and independence tend to enhance credibility (Eij¢nger and Hoeberichts, 2002) . Conversely, Geraats (2002b) argues that those central banks most subject to (or most concerned with) political pressures are the ones now most reluctant to be transparent about their operations.
2. An examination of the de…nitions of what is said to constitute an index of independence 11 shows that, in practice, there is a certain overlap with what is generally regarded as transparency. Aspect 1c in the E&G index of transparency is a case in point. Here a central bank with explicit instrument independence is rewarded equally for transparency 12 . Moreover Geraats (2002b) reports a correlation coe¢cient of 0.43 between the two, using one of the standard measures of independence.
3. Much of the recent literature has argued that a conservative (in ‡ation averse) central banker will have to put up with higher output variability if he/she is to retain lower in ‡ation on average (Rogo¤, 1985; Vredin and Warne 2000) . Given a signi…cant positive correlation between the measures of independence and transparency, that would explain our perverse result exactly. It is simply an artifact of the way this particular index of transparency has been constructed, and is not necessarily a feature of transparency in general.
4. The counterargument would be that the empirical literature has found little, if any, association between the degree of central bank independence and output volatility (Alesina and Summers, 1993) . But that does not go so far as to imply a negative relationship such as we are looking for. Nor does it explain why de ‡ation costs worsen as independence increases (Eij¢nger and De Haan 1996; Ball 1999 ).
In short we are still left with output volatility rising when the measures of independence and transparency overlap 13 . Thus the upshot of our results is that greater precision is really needed, …rst to determine what exactly this E&G index of transparency measures; and second to design measures of transparency and independence that distinguish properly between the two. Greater modelling precision may also be needed to control for the impact of …scal policy in reducing output variability; and for reducing the e¤ective independence of monetary policy or the clarity of (the private sectors view of) the central banks operations.
Conclusions
A simple model of transparency in Central Bank policy making shows that increases in the degree of transparency would not a¤ect the average levels of in ‡ation and output achieved. But it would decrease the degree of volatility in both in ‡ation and output gap levels -and the more so, in output volatility if the Central Bank is (weight) conservative. When we test these predictions against the only numerical index of transparency available for nine OECD countries in the 1990s, we …nd that all the predictions are veri…ed but for the reduction of output volatility. The latter appears to rise with increasing transparency. And although the size of the sample quite clearly limits our ability to draw conclusions, this result remains robust across the different sensitivity checks performed. It is likely therefore, that the transparency index captures some other elements of Central Bank behaviour -for example, di¤ering degrees of independence or uncertainty about the policy goals that the Central Bank ought to pursue. These two are observationally equivalent in our model. This conclusion therefore, underlines our initial hypotheses: it is important to distinguish clearly between that lack of transparency which refers to the possession of precise information which the CB chooses, strategically, not to reveal to the private sector; and that lack of transparency that arises through uncertainty, meaning that the Central Bank does not have precise information itself -although it is perfectly prepared to release what information it does have. These two cases may have quite di¤erent consequences, and these empirical results suggest that what passes for a lack of transparency in conventional discussions may be as much the latter as the former.
APPENDICES
A Imperfect Political Transparency: An Uncertain value for parameter b
The CB optimises the following:
and hence
We calculate the variance of in ‡ation as follows:
The level of output achieved in equilibrium is now
A.1 Imperfect Economic Transparency: An Uncertain value for parameter k As the CB optimises:
Solving this for ¼ ¤ produces:
And hence E(¼ ¤ ) = bk. The variance is calculated as follows
we calculate deviations from mean:
and actual variance:
¢ Similarly for output. The public forms expectations for in ‡ation as ¼ e = bc. In equilibrium therefore, output is equal to the following.
It is easy to see that E(y ¤ ) = 0. The variability of output in equilibrium is therefore given by:
assuming " and v are uncorrelated.
B Data
We examine the countries included in the E&G index, namely, New Zealand, UK, Sweden, Canada, the Euro area, US, Australia, Japan and Switzerland. We use the following quarterly series: CPI in ‡ation (year on year), real GDP (volumes de ‡ated by GDP de ‡ators) deviations from trend (calculated by the Hodrick-Prescott and the Cristiano-Fitzgerald …lters). The data range from the early 90s till the end of 2001 for most countries and are taken from Datastream and the ECB. As explained in the main text, the index of transparency re ‡ects an institutional set up that varies from country to country. To allow for this therefore, the macroeconomic variables are only considered for the relevant years for each of the countries, based on information available to us. The adjustments made therefore, are as follows:
² Sweden: we consider data from 1993 onwards since this is the …rst phase associated with the Riksbank gaining credibility (Berg et al 2002) .
² Australia: we consider data from 1996, the time the in ‡ation target was formally enshrined in the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy. (Aylmer, 2002) ² Switzerland: there has been a new monetary policy concept since the beginning of 2000 in Switzerland but this is too recent to allow for any variance in in ‡ation (Jordan and Peytrignet, 2002) . We consider data for the whole period therefore.
² UK: we consider the time period from 1998, since the Bank of England was given operational independence only in May 1997 (see Allsopp,2002) .
² Despite the late creation of EMU (1999) we consider data from the start of the 90s on the basis that convergence was necessary before the actual creation of a centralised monetary authority in Europe. We have experimented however, with shorter periods starting towards the end of the 90s but the results derived were very similar.
For the remainder of the countries we consider the period from the start of the 90s. ² Changing the Sample Size. An extra source of sensitivity naturally arises from the sample period chosen, for which to calculate the average and standard deviations. In the case of the UK this turns out to be particularly important. We present therefore, the impact implied on the whole index when the average and standard deviation of in ‡ation and output considered for the UK are calculated for the whole of the 90s and not starting from 1998. (Figure 9 ). We compare those again to …gures 1(a)-4(a). The results are now di¤erent to what we got before, in that any signi…cance in the results is lost and the relationship between average in ‡ation and transparency is positive (although insigni…cant). As already mentioned, this did not make much of a di¤erence in the case of the Euro area. Nevertheless, this points to the fact that identifying the correct sample (in the sense that it matches the institutional set-up described by the index) may be empirically important.
B.1 Sensitivity Analysis
² Deriving the Output Deviation from Trend. Finally we apply two standard methodologies to derive potential output, namely the HodrickPrescott, 1997 (HP) and the Christiano Fitzgerald 1999 (CF) …lters. The results obtained using the former are given in the main text. Figures 10-12 present the results obtained when using the CF …lter and are directly comparable to …gures 3, 4 and 6 respectively. We apply these two …lters because they make use of two alternative methodologies for extracting trends. The former relies thus on a smoothing parameter which encapsulates the trade-o¤ between having to reduce the variability of the derived series on the one hand and wanting to stick as close to the original data as possible, on the other. The CF …lter is part of a more recently developed literature and falls in the category of band-pass …lters. These types of …lters focus on a predetermined frequency range which has a clearer interpretation. However, it is a relatively new …lter which has not been widely tested empirically. We will therefore only use it as a yardstick for comparison. The comparisons are quite similar to ones previous made. The variance of the output gap is positively correlated with transparency and with very similar levels of signi…cance. The level of the output gap however, is now related negatively to transparency and is more stronger than before. It remains insigni…cant however at the con…dence levels considered.
² A case for omitted variables. Given the limitations of the data set, 25 the regressions performed can only be seen as an attempt to identify correlations rather than strong causal relationships between the variables examined. We acknowledge the fact that regressions of this sort will su¤er from omitted-variables e¤ects, re ‡ecting the possible in ‡uences of macroeconomic variables (like …scal policy stance, openness to trade) or possible correlations between the variability of in ‡ation and output. We have experimented with respect to the latter, therefore including the variability of output as a regressor in the variability of in ‡ation equation, and the other way round. The results obtained however, (available from the authors) are very similar to the ones presented.
² Alternative groupings. Naturally, there is no clear-cut way of grouping the sub-components of the E&G index. In the main text we have identi…ed Political Transparency with the sum of 1a, 1c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b and 4c and Economic Transparency with the sum of 1b, 2a, 2b, 2c, 5a, 5b, 5c and 1b. As an alternative grouping we have experimented with incorporating Policy transparency (4a, 4b and 4c) as part of the Economic grouping. The results (available by the authors) are very similar to ones already described (albeit political transparency is less signi…cant). 
